Against instructions a connecting wire was not inserted to its place and thereby the corresponding relay's function was inhibited. The blowdown system would have not worked automatically if called upon. Justifaction of level 1: Table 1, degradation of defence-in-depth without an initiator. Safety function availability. Within opertional limits and conditions. Additional factor: Safety culture deficiencies (in the quality assurance process).
An analysis by the Norwegian NGO Bellona of transborder trade operations with the customs code 840130 (irradiated fuel assemblies or fuel elements) show a more than twofold increase of import to EU countries of fresh nuclear fuel in cash terms – from 280 million Euros in 2022 to 686 million Euros in 2023. In physical […]
The French government has said it is "seriously" studying the option of building a plant to convert and enrich reprocessed uranium to cut its reliance on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. The only plant in the world that currently converts reprocessed uranium for use in nuclear power plants is in Russia. "The option of […]
Jan vd Putte quickly changed from dressing as the pied piper at the protest during the IAEA nuclear power conference to warn for the Russian nuclear power conglomerate Rosatom and its role in Ukraine.
Anke Herold, Executive Director Oeko-Institut, Freiburg (Germany), in Brussels about the claim to triple nuclear by 2050: IPCC scenarios vs forecast development of nuclear.
